As Washington leaves institutions it shaped, autocratic coalitions move to define the rules replacing it.
Christina Cottiero , assistant professor of political science at the University of Utah.
Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, professor of global policy and strategy at the University of California, San Diego.
In “Can the Liberal Order Survive America’s Retreat?”, Christina Cottiero and Emilie M. Hafner-Burton argue that American withdrawal will not destroy the liberal order overnight. Instead, it may create a fragmented system where regional coalitions replace universal democratic standards. Autocratic governments would then gain greater influence over rules governing trade, development, security and human rights.
The liberal order was never singular. It was a network of alliances, agencies and rules that made cooperation more predictable while giving democratic norms international weight. American power supplied its funding, diplomacy and credibility, even when Washington applied those principles inconsistently.
America’s retreat is no longer limited to rhetoric or isolated policy disputes. It is changing the institutional machinery through which the United States once shaped global rules, funded democratic programs and coordinated allies. Each withdrawal weakens not only current influence but also the trust and continuity required to rebuild it later.
Stephan Haggard ,research director for democracy and global governance at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation
Christina J. Schneider, professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego.
Stephan Haggard and Christina J. Schneider show how withdrawal surrenders funding, diplomatic leverage, institutional positions and long-term agenda-setting power. International organizations allowed Washington to shape global rules without depending only on military or economic coercion. Once other governments reorganize around a less reliable United States, formal reentry may not restore the influence created by decades of participation.
The retreat is now institutional. The administration dismantled the U.S. Agency for International Development in 2025, withdrew again from the UN Human Rights Council and stopped supporting several democracy and development programs. A January 2026 memorandum then ordered withdrawal from 66 organizations, including 35 non-UN bodies and 31 UN entities, such as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the UN Conference on Trade and Development and the UN Democracy Fund.
The White House presents those exits as a defense of sovereignty and taxpayer value. The essay reaches the opposite strategic conclusion, describing international organizations as effective instruments of American influence. Funding, staffing and participation allowed Washington to shape rules on trade, development, security and rights without relying only on pressure.
Withdrawal therefore does more than save dues or reject programs. It gives up votes, senior positions, agenda-setting power and the expectation that American diplomats will remain involved. As governments adjust to a less reliable United States, returning becomes costlier and lost influence becomes harder to recover.
The consequences extend further. The essay notes that the United States recently supplied as much as 15% of the World Health Organization’s budget before favoring narrower health initiatives. It also cites research projecting that reduced development assistance could contribute to nearly 10 million excess deaths through 2030, especially among vulnerable populations.
China and Russia are not abandoning multilateral institutions. They are increasing contributions, placing nationals in influential roles and reshaping mandates around sovereignty and regime security. Their approach accepts cooperation while weakening provisions that make governments answerable to citizens, monitors and independent organizations.
The shift is visible in funding. China is the second-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping and the largest provider of peacekeepers among the Security Council’s five permanent members. Beijing also pledged enough support to become the World Health Organization’s leading donor as American withdrawal threatened the agency’s finances.
Money creates leverage over staffing and priorities. The essay describes China and Russia pressing to weaken investigations, change human-rights budgets and favor procedures less threatening to authoritarian rule. Gulf monarchies have also expanded voluntary contributions to agencies facing U.S. cuts, gaining more influence over which programs survive.
Governments seeking alternatives to Western-led institutions are also expanding parallel forums. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the broader BRICS network provide venues for coordinating sovereignty-first positions, while the New Development Bank finances infrastructure and sustainable-development projects for emerging economies. The bank emphasizes national development ownership and the use of borrower-country systems, offering a different model from World Bank development-policy financing, which can require agreed policy and institutional actions before funds are released. More than 18 regional and cross-regional financial institutions now have memberships composed mostly of authoritarian regimes.
Campaign Now (Gemini), authoritarian coalitions fill the institutional vacuum.
The result is not rulelessness. It is a contest over rules governing internet control, election monitoring, development lending, civil-society access and human-rights scrutiny. When Washington leaves, authoritarian coalitions gain room to redefine accountability as interference and political protection as sovereignty.
American leadership also depends on democratic credibility at home. Freedom House reported that global freedom declined for a 20th consecutive year in 2025, with 54 countries deteriorating and only 35 improving. The United States was among the free countries with the largest declines, reflecting institutional dysfunction, executive dominance and pressure on expression.
Campaign Now (Gemini), global freedom declines for twenty years.
The related essay “When Polarization Turns Violent” explains why domestic division matters beyond reputation. Polarization becomes dangerous when hostility combines with demographic fear, political control feels tied to collective survival and the state stops enforcing equal protection. Most polarized societies remain peaceful, but institutions must hold when political actors test the boundaries.
“The Democratic Drain” identifies a quieter source of democratic erosion. Using Gallup World Poll data from roughly 120 countries, it argues that educated, internationally oriented and democratically inclined citizens often leave poorly governed states. Their departure removes not only opposition supporters but also journalists, lawyers, researchers, technocrats and civic leaders who can scrutinize foreign agreements and defend democratic standards.
That loss of human capital connects domestic weakness directly to international retreat. Countries with thinner civil societies and less institutional expertise may become more dependent on financing, technology, security assistance and diplomatic support from authoritarian partners, giving those governments greater influence over policy choices. Migration can therefore reinforce autocratic influence by leaving fewer domestic actors able to challenge opaque agreements, resist sovereignty-first rules or keep their governments anchored to democratic institutions.
The institutions resisting this shift are badly underfunded. “The Power of Freedom Philanthropy” estimates that less than 1% of roughly $900 billion in annual global giving supports freedom, democracy and civil liberties. Education receives more than 25 times as much, while even animal welfare attracts more funding than civil liberties.
Campaign Now (Gemini), democratic freedom receives less than one percent.
The argument is practical. Health, education and climate programs depend on courts, open information, accountable government and civic organizations capable of exposing failure. Funding services while neglecting freedom leaves those gains vulnerable to corruption, repression and political capture.
The essay proposes raising freedom’s share to 10% of global philanthropy over the next decade. In practice, that shift would require larger commitments from foundations already funding democracy and civil society, such as the Ford Foundation and Open Society Foundations, alongside donor-advised funds, technology wealth and cross-border pooled civic funds. Private giving cannot replace American diplomatic power or public development budgets. It can sustain independent media, legal defense, civic technology and democratic organizations during governmental retreat.
Europe and other democratic middle powers can preserve parts of liberal cooperation. The European Union, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea retain resources, diplomatic experience and strong interests in predictable rules. They can deepen coordination on trade, health, climate and selected human-rights initiatives.
They cannot reproduce the scale or legitimacy of consistent American leadership. Democratic allies have their own divisions, while several influential middle powers have experienced backsliding or remain authoritarian. A coalition broad enough to finance universal institutions may not agree on protecting civil society, monitoring elections or limiting state control over information.
The most dangerous assumption is that a future administration can simply reverse the exits. Institutional influence rests on reliability, and allies are planning for an America whose commitments may change every election. Rival governments are filling posts, funding programs and building coalitions that will not disappear when Washington returns.
Campaign Now (Gemini), lost influence becomes harder to recover.
Reengagement remains possible, but it requires more than renewed membership. The United States would need to rebuild diplomatic capacity, meet financial obligations, support democratic partners and prove that participation will survive partisan turnover. It must also explain that multilateral leadership is not charity but a way to shape rules before adversaries do.
America’s retreat is creating a vacuum, but the vacuum is not empty. Autocratic powers are using familiar institutions, regional bodies and financial leverage to advance rules that protect governments from scrutiny. The longer those arrangements operate, the more normal and durable they become.
The danger is both foreign and domestic. A weaker liberal order leaves civil society, independent media and democratic opposition with fewer protections, while polarization and selective emigration weaken societies expected to defend those values. Underfunding compounds the problem as authoritarian coordination becomes more sophisticated.
No other democratic power can fully replace the United States, but American leadership cannot be restored through nostalgia. Recovery requires dependable engagement, stronger domestic institutions and resources equal to the threat. The window remains open, yet every withdrawal makes the eventual return harder and the international environment less favorable to democracy.